# CP #1 — Unconditional Plan vs. QPQ CP

## Setup

### Plan

**The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China.**

### Counterplan

**The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China if and only if China further narrows its “negative list” of sectors exempt from a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.**

### Speech Order/Times

#### 2AC — read the block

#### 2NC — read the block

#### 1AR — 1:00

#### 2NR — 1:30

#### 2AR — 1:30

## Blocks

### 2AC

#### 1. Permute: do both. Simultaneous enactment solves: if China will reduce its negative list, perm has U.S. fulfill its end of agreement *first* — and China will reciprocate.

#### 2. Permute: do counterplan. Doesn’t sever — not *textually* competitive — added condition is plan-plus. Plan *should* be done — not aff’s burden to defend immediacy or certainty.

#### 3. Reject plan-contingent counterplans: hypergeneric process args distort the topic, hurting depth and clash over core controversies. Debatability trumps “literature” — no enforceable standard for solvency evidence. Disads sufficient to “test” unconditional engagement.

### 2NC

#### They say “do both” — this links to the SOEs DA — perm gives away bargaining leverage. China won’t reduce its negative list if the US *already reduced* CFIUS review.

#### They say “do counterplan” —

#### 1. This severs unconditional engagement. QPQ is plan-minus — counterplan only modifies CFIUS review China reduces the negative list, not in *all* circumstances. Plan should only be done *if* China acts.

#### 2. Textual competition *unnecessary* — texts are policy shorthand. Wording debates are unproductive and crowd-out substance — policy comparison is more valuable than semantics.

#### They say “reject CP” —

#### 1. *Topic* burden — engagement debates necessitate QPQ discussion. Conditional and unconditional are mutually exclusive options.

Kim and Kang 9 — Sung Chull Kim, Professor of Northeast Asian Studies at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and David C. Kang, Professor of International Relations and Business at the University of Southern California, 2009 (“Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion,” *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, Edited by Sung Chull Kim, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 1438427867, p. 9)

The five states, anchored by the Six-Party Talks, have had a common goal, the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. However, this goal is not the first priority of each state; each state has its own additional—sometimes more important—goals for engagement with North Korea. Accordingly, the type and the logic of each state's engagement strategy differ from those of every other state (see Table 1.1). In bilateral relations with North Korea, there are specific and important differences within these two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional. Japan takes a mostly coercive approach, and the United States maintains conditional engagement; China and Russia (and South Korea of the Roh administration) maintain unconditional engagement. The point is that all of these different types of engagement are in tension with one another. The five states' effort to remain in concert as they try to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions constitute a challenging issue.

#### 2. *Aff* choice — plan can specify QPQ. Condition counterplans are core neg ground when aff specifies unconditional engagement — scholarly literature supports.

Kahl and Brimley 8 — Colin Kahl, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, and Shawn Brimley, Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 2008 (“The Case for Conditional Engagement in Iraq,” Policy Brief — Center for a New American Security, March 6th, Available Online at http://www.cnas.org/node/155, Accessed 07-15-2013)

President Bush and his successor have only three basic choices on strategy for Iraq: unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, or unconditional disengagement. Only a policy of conditional engagement can help translate recent security gains into something more sustainable.

#### 3. Functional limits — topic is too broad without credible threat of QPQ. Protect neg ground — preparation already stretched thin because of country diversity and weak definitions of “economic engagement”.

#### 4. Disads *not* sufficient — impacts don’t outweigh case. Only counterplans effectively telescope debates onto core question of conditional vs. unconditional engagement.

#### 5. Race to the *top* — *solvency advocates* limit QPQ potential and force aff innovation on “*unconditional key*” advantages. Neg not responsible for all plan-contingent counterplans — narrow exception for QPQ is best middle ground.

# CP #2 — QPQ Plan vs. Unconditional CP

## Setup

### Plan

**The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China if and only if China further narrows its “negative list” of sectors exempt from a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States.**

### Counterplan

**The United States federal government should offer non-discriminatory and transparent CFIUS reviews of investment projects from China.**

#### Unconditional engagement is best — China will reject QPQ offers. [card]

### Speech Order/Times

#### 2AC — read the block

#### 2NC — read the block

#### 1AR — 1:00

#### 2NR — 1:30

#### 2AR — 1:30

## Blocks

### 2AC

#### 1. Permute: do both. Simultaneous enactment solves: if China won’t the negative list for CFIUS reform, perm *functionally* enacts counterplan — but perm best because it gives China a *chance* to agree.

#### 2. Permute: do counterplan. Doesn’t sever — not *functionally* competitive. Removing QPQ is plan-plus: counterplan reforms CFIUS review in all circumstances plan does, *plus more* — doesn’t disprove plan *should* be enacted.

### 2NC

#### They say “do both” —

#### 1. Links to Backlash DA — China will use QPQ *offer* to solidify anti-American narrative.

#### 2. Presumption *neg* — counterplan is less change because it doesn’t *offer* or *negotiate*.

#### They say “do counterplan” —

#### 1. Severs *plan text* — counterplan is plan-minus — it *excludes* the offer and negotiations. Textual competition sufficient — aff burden to defend plan necessary to ensure stability and clash.

#### 2. Severs *policy function* — it’s a topic burden: engagement debates necessitate QPQ discussion. Conditional and unconditional are mutually exclusive options.

Kim and Kang 9 — Sung Chull Kim, Professor of Northeast Asian Studies at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and David C. Kang, Professor of International Relations and Business at the University of Southern California, 2009 (“Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion,” *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, Edited by Sung Chull Kim, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 1438427867, p. 9)

The five states, anchored by the Six-Party Talks, have had a common goal, the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. However, this goal is not the first priority of each state; each state has its own additional—sometimes more important—goals for engagement with North Korea. Accordingly, the type and the logic of each state's engagement strategy differ from those of every other state (see Table 1.1). In bilateral relations with North Korea, there are specific and important differences within these two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional. Japan takes a mostly coercive approach, and the United States maintains conditional engagement; China and Russia (and South Korea of the Roh administration) maintain unconditional engagement. The point is that all of these different types of engagement are in tension with one another. The five states' effort to remain in concert as they try to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions constitute a challenging issue.

#### 3. Logical opportunity cost — unconditional engagement is a distinct policy.

Kartman 9 — Charles Kartman, Former Director, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Susan Shirk, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), Ho Miu Lam Professor, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego, John Delury, Associate Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 2009 (“North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” Report of an Independent Task Force convened by Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October, Available Online: http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/north\_korea\_inside\_out.pdf, Date Accessed: 05/06/2013)

A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior. In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization. This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful. It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats. The U.S. can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up.

While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement.

#### 4. Aff model *wrong* — competition derives from the *offer*, not the *outcome*. Conflation wrecks rigorous policy comparison — engagement is a question of *means*, not *ends*.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

# CP #3 — QPQ Plan vs. Add-a-Condition CP

## Setup

### Plan

#### The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression if and only if China peacefully resolves its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas.

### Counterplan

#### The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression if and only if China peacefully resolves its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepts the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

### Speech Order/Times

#### 2AC — read the block

#### 2NC — read the block

#### 1AR — 1:00

#### 2NR — 1:30

#### 2AR — 1:30

## Blocks

### 2AC

#### 1. Permute: do both. *Either* both offers are issued simultaneously—*maximizing the chance of “say yes”*—or added conditions are tacked on to the plan—capturing the net-benefit.

#### 2. Permute: do counterplan. Doesn’t sever — not *textually* competitive — added conditions are plan-plus. Plan *should* be done — counterplan doesn’t disprove.

### 2NC

#### They say “do both” —

#### 1. Links to Assurances DA — gives China the option to “say yes” to an offer that doesn’t accept US involvement in East Asian security.

#### 2. Guarantees weaker condition — China will choose minimum QPQ. Simultaneous offer destroys negotiating leverage.

#### 3. Aff model *wrong* — competition derives from the *offer*, not the *outcome*. Conflation wrecks rigorous policy comparison — engagement is a question of *means*, not *ends*.

Resnick 1 — Evan Resnick, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Columbia University, holds an M.Phil. in Political Science and an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, 2001 (“Defining engagement,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 54, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ABI/INFORM Complete)

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.

This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28

Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### They say “do counterplan”—

#### 1. Functionally impossible — the counterplan effectively bans the plan by taking the initial offer off the table. Starting negotiations on basis of plan *foregoes the possibility* of starting negotiations on basis of counterplan.

#### 2. Neg offer is plan-minus — plan ends the commitment to Taiwan in more circumstances than counterplan.

#### 3. Textual competition *unnecessary* — texts are policy shorthand. Wording debates are unproductive and crowd-out substance — policy comparison is more valuable than semantics.

#### 4. *Aff* choice — plan can specify conditional or unconditional engagement. Different QPQs are core neg ground when aff specifies — scholarly literature supports.

Nincic 11 — Miroslav Nincic, Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Davis, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, 2011 (“Preface,” *The Logic of Positive Engagement*, Published by Cornell University Press, ISBN 0801450063, p. vii-viii)

The failure of negative sanctions does not imply the necessary success of positive inducements, as the conditions for a favorable outcome in either case are restrictive. With respect to the latter, our starting point is a closer look at two purposes that positive incentives could serve. The first is to offer an adversary some concession intended to produce a desired counterconcession. The objective is a trade involving policy changes on the target's side; inducements offered in this spirit play out in the context of what I call the exchange model. Our task is to determine what objectives can most plausibly be attained in this fashion and what conditions bode best for success. The second aim of positive inducements is more ambitious: to change the other side's basic motivations so that bribes and punishments eventually become less necessary. The purpose is not so much to promote a trade as to catalyze a thorough overhaul of relations by altering the other side's policy priorities. Inducements offered with this purpose partake of what I call the catalytic model. I examine the logic behind the conceptions of [end page vii] positive inducements associated with these two models and the conditions for success or failure in both.

Success in the exchange model requires, above all, that inducements be of a magnitude sufficient to offset incentives to undesirable behavior on the target's part. I explain why it is often very difficult in the U.S. political context to offer concessions that are objectively sufficient, and I examine the circumstances within the target country that make it more or less receptive to an exchange of concessions—a condition of latent regime instability boding best for such receptivity.

#### 5. Functional limits — large inventory of QPQs ensures unpredictable affs unless neg can test solvency advocate evidence with a different offer. Protect neg ground — preparation already stretched thin because of size of US-China relationship and weak definitions of “engagement”.

# Helpful Negative Evidence

### Conditional vs. Unconditional Important

#### Conditional and unconditional engagement are mutually exclusive.

Kim and Kang 9 — Sung Chull Kim, Professor of Northeast Asian Studies at the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and David C. Kang, Professor of International Relations and Business at the University of Southern California, 2009 (“Introduction: Engagement as a Viable Alternative to Coercion,” *Engagement with North Korea: A Viable Alternative*, Edited by Sung Chull Kim, Published by SUNY Press, ISBN 1438427867, p. 9)

The five states, anchored by the Six-Party Talks, have had a common goal, the nuclear disarmament of North Korea. However, this goal is not the first priority of each state; each state has its own additional—sometimes more important—goals for engagement with North Korea. Accordingly, the type and the logic of each state's engagement strategy differ from those of every other state (see Table 1.1). In bilateral relations with North Korea, there are specific and important differences within these two types of engagement: conditional and unconditional. Japan takes a mostly coercive approach, and the United States maintains conditional engagement; China and Russia (and South Korea of the Roh administration) maintain unconditional engagement. The point is that all of these different types of engagement are in tension with one another. The five states' effort to remain in concert as they try to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions constitute a challenging issue.

#### It’s a meaningful difference .

Jakštaitė 10 — Gerda Jakštaitė, Doctoral Candidate in Political Sciences and Diplomacy at Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania), 2010 (“Containment and Engagement as Middle-Range Theories,” *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics*, Volume 3, Number 2, December, Available Online at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjlp.2010.3.issue-2/v10076-010-0015-7/v10076-010-0015-7.xml?format=INT, Accessed 05-06-2013, p. 188-189)

Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course [end page 188] promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state’s behaviour.99

Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state’s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state’s foreign policy objectives.100

Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### Real world strategic choice.

Kahl and Brimley 8 — Colin Kahl, Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, and Shawn Brimley, Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, 2008 (“The Case for Conditional Engagement in Iraq,” Policy Brief — Center for a New American Security, March 6th, Available Online at http://www.cnas.org/node/155, Accessed 07-15-2013)

President Bush and his successor have only three basic choices on strategy for Iraq: unconditional engagement, conditional engagement, or unconditional disengagement. Only a policy of conditional engagement can help translate recent security gains into something more sustainable.

### Choosing Conditions Important

#### Determining best conditions necessary for policy success.

Nincic 11 — Miroslav Nincic, Professor of Political Science at the University of California-Davis, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University, 2011 (“Preface,” *The Logic of Positive Engagement*, Published by Cornell University Press, ISBN 0801450063, p. vii-viii)

The failure of negative sanctions does not imply the necessary success of positive inducements, as the conditions for a favorable outcome in either case are restrictive. With respect to the latter, our starting point is a closer look at two purposes that positive incentives could serve. The first is to offer an adversary some concession intended to produce a desired counterconcession. The objective is a trade involving policy changes on the target's side; inducements offered in this spirit play out in the context of what I call the exchange model. Our task is to determine what objectives can most plausibly be attained in this fashion and what conditions bode best for success. The second aim of positive inducements is more ambitious: to change the other side's basic motivations so that bribes and punishments eventually become less necessary. The purpose is not so much to promote a trade as to catalyze a thorough overhaul of relations by altering the other side's policy priorities. Inducements offered with this purpose partake of what I call the catalytic model. I examine the logic behind the conceptions of [end page vii] positive inducements associated with these two models and the conditions for success or failure in both.

Success in the exchange model requires, above all, that inducements be of a magnitude sufficient to offset incentives to undesirable behavior on the target's part. I explain why it is often very difficult in the U.S. political context to offer concessions that are objectively sufficient, and I examine the circumstances within the target country that make it more or less receptive to an exchange of concessions—a condition of latent regime instability boding best for such receptivity.

#### Changing objectives changes the strategy.

Haass and O’Sullivan 2k — Richard N. Haass, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, former senior aide to President George Bush, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, 2000 (“Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” *Survival*, Volume 42, Number 2, Summer, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf, Accessed 05-06-2013, p. 2)

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

### Unconditional Competes

#### Unconditional engagement is a distinct policy — the counterplan is an opportunity cost of the plan.

Kartman 9 — Charles Kartman, Former Director, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), Susan Shirk, Director, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), Ho Miu Lam Professor, School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego, John Delury, Associate Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society, 2009 (“North Korea Inside Out: The Case for Economic Engagement,” Report of an Independent Task Force convened by Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and The University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, October, Available Online: http://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/north\_korea\_inside\_out.pdf, Date Accessed: 05/06/2013)

A second objection is that engagement should be conditioned on North Korean behavior. In the past, Washington has conditioned engagement with North Korea on progress in denuclearization. This strategy puts the cart before the horse, and has been unsuccessful. It has the perverse result of strengthening arguments inside North Korea that the country needs a strong deterrent to protect itself from outside threats. The U.S. can better advance its aims by opening the space for change to take place from the ground up.

While some engagement should continue to be conditioned on progress on the nuclear and other fronts, many forms of engagement should proceed with no conditions attached. Our report is focused on the economic side of engagement, and particularly on forms of economic engagement that can and should proceed now, without any conditionality, as first steps in a process of phased engagement.

#### Policymakers must choose—it competes.

Busch 9 — Benjamin C. Busch, Master’s Candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School, Major in the United States Air Force, holds a B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, 2009 (“Cognitive Bargaining Model: An Analysis Tool for Third Party Incentives?,” Master’s Thesis Submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, December, Available Online at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Dec/09Dec\_Busch.pdf, Accessed 07-16-2013, p. 11-12)

Policy makers must make tough decisions regarding when and to whom to offer positive incentives, yet the literature surrounding how much incentive to offer and whether incentives can achieve the desired policy effect (ex ante) from a third party viewpoint is still thin. As the United States is called upon to answer crises, such as the one in Sudan, it is as important now as ever to develop a framework for analyzing the best use of incentives ex ante. In general, it is usually easy to determine whether incentives achieved the desired policy objective after the fact (North Korea may be one glaring exception). However, ex ante, it is much more difficult to predict the effect of incentives. An analysis tool is needed that can help policy makers properly frame incentives from a third party point of view. This is not to say that ex ante analysis is easy. It is not, as information is often incomplete. However, within a clear framework, it is easier to determine what questions to ask and what information is needed to place incentives appropriately. This thesis does not seek to debate whether incentives are useful or not. For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that incentives are at least a viable policy option, but also consider that incentives are not always the right option. Furthermore, this work is not a continuation of the debate surrounding what leads to an [end page 11] effective incentive but assumes that those crafting incentives do so in the best way possible to minimize their drawbacks and maximize their effect. It also is not focused on the use of incentives in a two-way negotiation or bargaining. In a two-way bargaining situation, incentives have a different effect than when offered by a third party. Rather, the purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework to aid policy makers in choosing how best to use incentives from a third party view. The cognitive bargaining model developed within this thesis is one attempt at a solution. The cognitive bargaining model is developed by first reviewing the concepts and assumptions of Fearon’s model of bargaining and war and then, Berejikian’s thoughts on prospect theory are incorporated. The model is tested by analyzing Ukraine’s bargain with Russia in 1992 and comparing it to the bargain reached in 1994. Within the Ukraine case study, the effect of third party positive incentives on the bargaining outcome are considered. It was found that the cognitive bargaining model shows larger than necessary incentives were used with Ukraine in 1992. These incentives contributed to a shift in status quo perception. Subsequently, Ukraine increased its demands. In 1994, the incentives offered by the United States were crucial to the bargain between both Russia and Ukraine. However, lesser incentives may have worked if the predictions of the cognitive bargaining model were considered during the 1992 bargain. This thesis concludes by discussing the limitation of the cognitive bargaining model, as well as the need for further testing and validation. However, due to the promising results from the case of Ukraine’s denuclearization, policy makers could use a cognitive bargaining framework to place incentives where it is possible to achieve the most “bang for the buck.”

#### Incentive offers must be carefully considered — the counterplan excludes the offer.

Busch 9 — Benjamin C. Busch, Master’s Candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School, Major in the United States Air Force, holds a B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, 2009 (“Cognitive Bargaining Model: An Analysis Tool for Third Party Incentives?,” Master’s Thesis Submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, December, Available Online at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Dec/09Dec\_Busch.pdf, Accessed 07-16-2013, p. 72-73)

In conclusion, as the United States moves from a strategy more focused on punishment to one focused on engagement, positive incentives are likely to take on an increased role in foreign policy. The incentives recently offered by the Obama administration to the regime in Sudan are a shadow of what may become a more common approach. However, this does not mean that incentives are right for all situations. A tool for when to use incentives as a third party would be a powerful tool in the hands of policy makers. This thesis proposes a cognitive bargaining model designed for ex ante analysis. Although not without limitations, the cognitive bargaining model is an attempt at merging academic theory into a relevant policy making tool. On such merit, it deserves consideration for more research and study. Snyder and Diesing in Conflict Among Nations said,

Whether to be firm or tough toward an adversary…is a perennial and central dilemma of international relations. A rational resolution of this dilemma depends on an accurate assessment of the long run interests and intentions…Conciliation of specific grievances may be cheaper than engaging in a power struggle.192

As the United States moves forward, blindly offer incentives to state or non-state actors with the hope of achieving a policy outcome is not a good idea. The cognitive bargaining model provides a tool for accurate assessment that helps minimize the central dilemma of international relations, while preserving the U.S.’ limited national treasure. [end page 72]

By learning to do this right now, historians may look back some day and remark how the United States effectively applied its instruments of “Smart Power” to achieve a better world in the 21st century.

### Offering Less Competes

#### Offering less competes—scarce resources necessitate careful choice.

Busch 9 — Benjamin C. Busch, Master’s Candidate at the Naval Postgraduate School, Major in the United States Air Force, holds a B.S. from the United States Air Force Academy, 2009 (“Cognitive Bargaining Model: An Analysis Tool for Third Party Incentives?,” Master’s Thesis Submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School, December, Available Online at http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2009/Dec/09Dec\_Busch.pdf, Accessed 07-16-2013, p. 3)

It is possible to argue that $34.9 billion is an ample amount to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. Even so, it is obvious that resources for incentives are not unlimited. In other words, policy makers choosing to offer incentives must do so in the most economical and efficient way possible. Therefore, the United States should provide incentives only when necessary to achieve policy goals, in the right amount, and to the right persons. Let us look again at the choice to offer incentives to Sudan. The United States is neither a challenger nor defender in the conflict in Darfur. However, it has a third party policy objective of gaining an ally (Sudan) in the war on terrorism. The United States is faced with several choices. It must choose which side to incentivize. The United States could provide positive inducements to the challengers, the government of Sudan, or both sides to end the conflict. In other words, assume that the United States is willing to put $10 million toward a positive incentive package to achieve its foreign policy goals in Sudan. It could offer all $10 million to just the Sudan government, $10 million to just the SLA and Jem, or $6 million to the Sudan government and $4 million to the SLA/Jem. Furthermore, if the Sudan government is willing to comply with United States wishes for $3 million and the offer is $10 million, the United States has overspent. This begs the question, “How to maximize the effects of the limited resources put toward positive incentives to most efficiently achieve U.S. foreign policy goals?”

### They Say: “No Literature”

#### Robust academic literature.

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To answer how to maximize the effects of incentives, it is necessary to look to academic literature for insight. Positive influence strategies are a growing body of literature in the academic world, which notably resurged after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. As the world transitioned away from a bipolar world, within which there was a realist dominated foreign policy relationship, many noticed that the tough stances [end page 3] prescribed by realism were not having the desired effect. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Syria all endured the toughest U.S. sanctions and best diplomatic efforts with little effect. People began to remember that the, “primary goal of foreign policy is to change a state’s desires, not necessarily defeat them militarily.”12 The following review of literature on positive incentives in this thesis is important for three reasons. It provides a basis for where incentives fit into overall influence strategies, outlines the current thoughts and debates surrounding positive incentives, and identifies some important gaps in knowledge.